

# THE NEXT WAR

Demoralized but Bellicose World May Come to It in Five Years, Unless the League and Universal Training Are Adopted as Protection

By *ALBERT BUSHNELL HART*  
Professor of Government, Harvard University

AM I in favor of the war? Certainly I am in favor of the war. I was in favor of the last war, I am in favor of the next war. I have been in favor of the next war for the last fifteen years."

That is the way Artemus Ward of humorous memory expressed himself a half century ago when his loyalty was doubted. Quite a few good people nowadays are striving hard to make it clear that they have been in favor of this war from the first, although newspaper files contain their public statements that the Germans were sure to win, coupled up close to the deduction that they ought to win. For instance, Mr. Berger is deprived by an unfeeling court and an unsympathetic House of Representatives of an opportunity to explain on the floor of Congress his lack of confidence in any kind of war.

Every right-minded person has to believe in war now, just as he believes in the Ten Commandments and Washington's Farewell Address and the Gettysburg Speech. We don't like pacifists and have little sympathy for the conscientious objectors, who, after all, look upon war from the same angle as that of William Penn and Tolstoy and thousands of the best men and women that the world has even seen. The country has accepted war as a hard, inevitable fact along with hurricanes and the high cost of living, as a kind of "inscrutable act of Providence by which our dear brother has been taken from us."

Things were not so hard and fast in the last war before the last—which was no longer ago than 1898. The impression left on the public mind by the Spanish war was that of lofty sympathy with an oppressed people struggling to establish a free republic, of desperate and gallant deeds by land and sea, of the mighty removal of the Spanish boa constrictor from the collapsing waist of America. It was a victorious war. The Spaniards ingloriously retired from the last remnants of their colonial empire.

All that was a result of a few weeks of war. We forgot the amazing stupidity and incompetence of that war, the foul camps, the preventable deaths from typhoid fever, the lack of discipline, the breakdown of transportation, the spectacle of a command of artillery transported from Tampa to Cuba, the men in one ship, the horses in another and the guns in a third. Suppose it had been a really brilliant war, hard fought, testing all the energies of the country, could we have done more than to annex Porto Rico and the Philippines?

In those days of old, notwithstanding the victories, people were allowed to oppose the war from start to finish without being jailed or investigated by Congressional committees. The anti-imperialists were against that particular war, that kind of a war, and almost any kind of a war. They had their newspapers, their societies, their public meetings, their appeals to Congress. A man could be a pacifist and still a member of a good club and Superintendent of a Sunday school.

Many Americans opposed the Spanish war because they thought it a war of aggression and conquest. Our experiences since 1914 have demonstrated that the most powerful nations may be compelled to go to war because it is thrust at them. A great lesson in public law has been brought to the world in the failure of all artificial barriers to stop a strong,

well-organized and consciousness nation like Germany. It took a long time to bring that fact home to the minds of Americans, especially those who had been putting their confidence in arbitration treaties and Hague courts. The distinction is now probably clearly drawn between a passionate desire for peace and a guarantee of peace. Roosevelt's references to the example of China had great effect—the most peaceful people on earth and yet exposed to civil and external war against which they were helpless.

Yet from 1914 to 1917 there was no effective public sentiment that war was inevitable for the United States. From the beginning a small number of prominent men vainly urged that the United States ought to go to war to aid in protecting Anglo-Saxondom, or in order to carry out an international guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium. No headway was made toward taking the field to put an end to German atrocities in the field of war. It is very doubtful whether even the impending collapse of the Western allies would have brought in the

United States, but for the personal experience of German methods of sea warfare and German official behavior inside the United States. The statesmen who roused the people of the United States to war were neither their own President nor the leaders of the opposing party; they were Admiral von Tirpitz and Ambassador von Bernstorff.

Those influences have ceased and still we are at war. Nominally with Germany and Austria, through a preposterous snarling of the processes of Government by which the treaty is not made effective. War in the main field has ended, but economic war still goes on, to our own detriment as well as to that of the European peoples. We cannot seem to shake ourselves loose from a war which American people never desired for its own sake, out of which they preferred not to draw advantages and prestige in Europe, and which now involves the suffering and death of hundreds of thousands of harmless men, women, and children.

There is also a present war in Europe, actual, grim, murderous. All around the

borders of the defunct Russian Empire wages fierce war, pitiless war, a war destructive of property, of life, and of the human soul. Armies are in the field in Poland, in the Baltic Provinces, in Hungary, in Rumania, in Asia Minor. The Egyptians are watching their chance to attack their masters, and the Syrians will presumably feel no more kindly toward the French. Enver Pasha, the worst and most dangerous man in the East, is trying to spread fire and sword all the way across to India. The Armenians, despoiled, tortured, and frightfully diminished, are subject to another inroad of ferocious enemies. The Jugoslavs are ready to battle for their part. Even on the southern border of the United States is a smoldering fire which may break out in flames any day. People do not like war—there is hardly a soldier returning from the ranks who does not hate war—yet the world is still in the midst of conflicts and danger.

The cry which went through the world in 1917 was that civilization was dying unless the Western powers could band together "to make democracy safe" and, much more directly, to make safe their capitals, ports, factories, mines, and fields. For this, 2,000,000 American soldiers crossed the sea, and by their actual fighting and their presence turned the balance. And who can fail to see that democracy is still at least unsatisfied, even in the democratic countries of Great Britain, France, and Italy? Public opinion in those countries is still a boiling pot; nobody can say with any confidence what party or what political group will be in power and make the decisions in those three countries five years hence. And all those countries are in a dangerous, and some in a desperate, financial situation.

Of course, there is no longer immediate danger of invasion. All the land is there, and except in the theatre of war, all the buildings and railroads and canals and cleared fields. Most of the population remains. There is, however, a great disruption of industry and a dangerous depletion of the stocks and goods and necessary machinery.

The public debts of all those countries are simply a system under which a minority of the population expect to receive part of the earnings of the majority of the population in the form of interest as far ahead as you can see. All those countries are on a paper money basis, and the so-called fall of exchange is in one sense simply a measure of the lack of confidence that bankers and money kings feel in the final redemption of that paper money in specie. The simple truth is that the whole machinery of international trade and exchange is demoralized. Before the war it was working like a well-oiled engine, each valve and plunger and cam playing exactly into the neighboring parts. Now the whole thing is out of plumb. It jars itself. The delicate balance is destroyed.

The last thing that those nations want is war, for, so far as territory is concerned, all three are gorged with new accessions which it will take years to assimilate. They have all lost frightfully in man power, they are weary unto death with the sacrifices and suffering of war. They will provoke no war in our time. They will support almost any league of peace which is acceptable to the United States, because they realize that a league which the United States will not join will sooner or later be felt antagonistic



LATEST PORTRAIT OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Shortly before his death Colonel Roosevelt went to visit his friend John Burroughs at the home of Princess Lvoff, who was painting the portrait of the author-naturalist. She asked him whether he would not let her add his portrait to her collection. He agreed to sit for a crayon portrait. He went twice, the first time accompanied by Robert Bacon, one-time Ambassador to France, and Anthony Fiala, the arctic explorer. The second time he went with Mr. Bacon.

In her reminiscences of these visits the Princess says she could add little to the likeness at the second visit, because the Colonel was plainly showing the effects of his illness. He died shortly afterward. Princess Lvoff is including this last picture of him in an album of famous American men she has painted. Among them are Thomas A. Edison, Admiral Dewey, and Joseph H. Choate.

by this country. They are coming out from under the ether with the deadly sickness of their half-recovered patience.

When you turn to Eastern Europe and Western Asia, the patient has taken not ether but hasheesh, and is either submerged in dreams or raving with terror and fury. Germany undoubtedly wants peace for the present, but, as a vigorous and intellectual German has recently written: "We Germans in general remain sound and complete; so much the world will certainly experience in the future." Nobody can believe that the German people have been made a peace-loving nation by their defeat.

The new Central Powers are in confusion and war, the Czechoslovaks have defined their boundary and settled down to it, but the Poles are still fighting for territory against their northern and eastern neighbors. The Jugoslavs, who aim to be a great power, seem likely to be excluded from connection with the sea by an adequate port. In the Balkans the Macedonian question is no more settled than it has been at any time these ten years, and Bulgaria still watches for the long expected opportunity to become the principal Balkan power. The Greeks justly ask for Thrace, with its Greek population, and unjustly occupy parts of Aidin, with a considerable Turkish population.

Do we realize that all the passions which brought about war in 1914 are still rampant? Germany, Italy, Poland, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, the Ukraine are all fighting, or wish they were fighting, for territory and prestige. Those Rumanians who were formerly imbedded in Hungary against their will have carried with them into the Rumanian State a large body of Germans against their wills. The only self-determination in which those little countries seem to have confidence is the right to decide on war.

The race antagonisms in Austria-Hungary have disappeared because the empire has disappeared; but nobody can believe that the Slavs who live in the dead empire will love the Hungarians and the Germans as neighbors any better than they loved them as masters. War is still going on in many parts of Eastern Europe, a despicable war of violence and lust and torture, war such as the Turks practiced when they ravaged these unhappy lands.

The Turks are still harrying Christians in the Asiatic dominions and demanding of mankind to leave them Constantinople, because they are such perfect gentlemen. Nor does Europe seem any more disposed now than before the war to free itself once for all from the intolerable shame of permitting a small Asiatic race which never could have lived except by strengthening itself with Christian blood to gain a footing in Europe, and though an uncommercial people to hold the natural commercial centre of the Near East.

As well give back Jerusalem to the Turks as Constantinople. They have forfeited both.

The present net result of the war, however, is that four European powers—Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece—have a foothold in Egypt, Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, which they will never give up except by force or the pressure of world public opinion. Turkey is practically destroyed already, has lost Arabia, lost the Tigres and Euphrates Valley, lost the Holy Land; now it asks to be allowed to hold a strip of Europe and to complete the extinction of the Armenians. There is war if the Turks are allowed again to pull the wool over the eyes of Europe; and it will take something like war to make them desist.

Over other parts of Asia floats a war cloud. The so-called Treaty of Peace has not made the Chinese and the Japanese friends, and it has probably encouraged the people of India to demand a new status and new privileges. Siberia is both Asiatic and European, and a dangerous and incalculable element toward both countries.

As for Russia, who shall venture to understand or predict, except that one hundred million people speak Russian, have Russian traditions, and think Russian; that they occupy a country as capable of self-supply of everything needed in peace or war as the United States of America; that they have a strong sense of their significance in the world and undoubtedly the same intention and expectation of some day hewing their way down the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the open sea.

We Americans hold the indefinite impression that Europe and Asia are exhausted; that nobody can afford to go to war. Quite the contrary. Notwithstanding the losses of tens of millions of men, the flower of their age, their

younger brothers are coming right along; and five years hence there will be as many young men from 17 to 25 as there were in 1914. Countries which depend on food from outside are for the time being handicapped, but Russia and Poland, India, China, and Japan can feed themselves and their armies. Navies are of slow growth, yet it is doubtful whether any heavy ironclad war fleet will ever again put to sea in face of the dangers from beneath and above, and from the new shells which threaten to pierce any defensive armor.

Future wars are going to be fought, like the last stages of the present war, by troops lying in trenches and aided and protected by airships. Supremacy in the air means victory. Airships in an inventive and mechanical nation are comparatively easy to build in great numbers and require a slender force to man them. This throws a great advantage on the side of the most highly educated nations. No more wars can be won by immense forces of reckless, mounted horsemen. But you must never forget that the Turks were once the best artillerymen of Europe. Chemists and engine builders can be acquired. If the East Indians and the Chinese begin building airships, who can stay them?

Can the world finance more wars? Not by borrowing from other countries, as Russia did from France, and France from the United States; we must remember, however, that a country which has coal, iron, timber, chemicals, raw materials, and plenty of men can keep an army in the field by starving or semi-starving the civil population. There is no physical reason why, in five or ten years, the great struggle may not be renewed.

Suppose Europe and Asia broke loose again. Will that disturb us? Can we not keep on reading the Farewell Address under our own vines and fig trees? Certainly we can, unless certain possible difficulties come in. It is conceivable that troubles might arise over the presence in the United States of hundreds of thousands of citizens of countries that had gone to war elsewhere. It might chance that rival powers would try to draw munitions from the United States, and, if one gained control of the sea against the other, our neutrality would be assailed.

It might even happen that American ships and property and citizens would be

killed by illegal methods of warfare by sea or land. Vessels with scores of Americans, including children, might be sent to the bottom without notice. We might even become persuaded that one of the parties to the war would, if victorious, take the first opportunity to finish us up.

What would we do in those circumstances? What could we do, but what was done in 1917? Declare war and trust in Providence! The point is obvious: Either we were wrong in joining the war in 1917, or we shall be right to join it in like circumstances in a future year. Let us not deceive ourselves. The temper of the world is bellicose. Whether for good or for evil, the United States declines to take the commanding position of leader and arbiter in the world's affairs, which the Western powers desired and the other allies were ready to accept. So far the United States has held aloof from the League of Nations, the only formal agency for preserving peace by preventing at least some wars. We cannot protect ourselves by George Washington's maxim except by following George Washington's principle of developing new policies to meet new dangers.

If the world is still in danger; if the United States will not join in a concerted effort to combine the peace-loving and peace-preserving forces of the world for the common benefit of mankind, there is only one other thing which a self-respecting nation can do. That is, to get ready; not by a standing army, but by a system of giving young men as they come along a year's military training which will compel them to learn the first principles of health and sanitation, which will develop future officers. Alongside it must go the most careful technical preparation of essential military material, particularly for air warfare.

Let us never again be caught as we were in 1917, a nation of one hundred millions without a single practicable modern war plane, without a fleet of destroyers, without available submarines, without a trench bomb or a field telephone system or wireless equipment, without a single battery of great field guns, without an officer trained in modern trench warfare. We have once escaped the danger of being caught unawares by an invading enemy. As sensible, practical, self-governing men and women, let us at least make that form of self-destruction impossible.