

THE ALLIES OF THE FUTURE

A Meditation on the Second Anniversary of the Beginning of the Great War in Europe

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OVER in Germany a rule of the soldiers' pension system has become a routine phrase: "Years of war count double." In our system of thoughts and feelings it is not sufficient to count the years of this world war as if they simply had twofold or even tenfold length. Two years have passed today, and we feel as if a whole age had gone by since peace and goodwill gave charm and melody to our wondrous life. The "piping times of peace"—we can hardly reach back to them in our frightened memories, and whatever we do remember gazes at us with cold and disillusioned eyes. So much has proved wrong, and when really the horrors of the war have ended, we shall have to recast everything in our mind. We shall have to relearn the axioms. Dogmas which we had accepted as certain in the world of commerce and industry, of technique and intercourse, of international law and politics, of morals and history, have turned out to be fallacies. Not only at the belligerent coasts were the gleaming signal fires extinguished when the war began; it became dark on neutral shores, too, and dark on the shores of our friendships.

Perhaps the greatest inner loss befell those who in those distant days of peace had given their thought and their life to the idea of a lasting friendship between America, Great Britain and Germany. This had been an inspiring hope for many of us, and the fulfillment had seemed so near. Surely it was not dictated by any lack of sympathy for other nations; in those sunny days of yore who did not feel that his life was richer for the contact with the fascinating brilliancy of France and the mellow beauty of Italy, with the genial spirit of Austria and the inexhaustible soul of Russia, with the admirable dash of Japan and the tremendous power for civil good in the small States of Europe? Nevertheless to us the great historic chord was America, Great Britain, and Germany, three nations so different in traits and traditions, and yet so alike in their health and strength and moral energy. We felt they were the three really progressive peoples which ought to work in growing harmony for the glorious advance of the world. Every day, we fancied, brought them nearer together, the three Teutonic master nations in which the aristocratic will toward highest civilization blended with the democratic spirit of individual responsibility.

The day of disaster long, long ago destroyed this hope and this belief;

hatred alone hisses through the Teutonic lands. Every British thought is red with rage

against Germany and every German feeling hurls its anger against England. America boils with indignation against the kaiserites, and the fatherland is disgusted with America. Yes, even England's contempt for America has broken out again, and America is at the end of its patience with a nation which destroys its mail and its trade with the neutrals and humbles it by its blacklists. A bitter warfare of minds has come over the three peoples, and all the dreams of the better past are cruelly shattered.

And now as the second year of woe and terror dies, stained with blood, and

the third year of war begins, which we all feel must bring an end to the carnage, we cannot help asking with trembling lips: what will come after? No memory of our past wishes can aid us in finding

an answer. A new time must begin with new ideas and with new emotions. All was wrong; we must free ourselves from the old fetters and approach everything afresh. How will it be possible to build again a civilized universe in which it is worth while to labor? No other problem can be of equal importance; it is the one question of the future. Today at last we know that the year is pregnant with decision. A moral preparedness for the new tremendous issues is our most solemn duty. Without petty prejudices and without selfish wishes we must turn our face to the future: what can, what

must it bring? But behold! The future does not appear bewildering. If we look at it earnestly, the chaos seems to yield to order, and if we ask boldly the final question, we get one and only one simple



clear-cut reply; the ultimate outcome of the world war will be just what we had hoped before the war, a firm alliance of America, Great Britain, and Germany.

To be sure, if we began a long spun-out discussion with the genius of history, we should hear in the preamble many other points which are true and important. Why ought we to rush to such plans of alliance which appear so unnatural in the turmoil of these days? Ought we not rather to think first of the fact that far from all alliances every nation will develop a strong, self-centred patriotic pride and ambition? Not a firecracker patriotism will be the aftermath of the war. The greatness of the calamity will have sobered and deepened the love for the national spirit and the national institutions. The nationalism which will grow beyond any measure previously known will be higher and nobler; it will be a belief in the unique mission of one's country.

Each people has its traits and its tasks. The feeling that this task is valuable and necessary for the history of mankind and that it cannot be replaced by the achievements of any other land is an eternal spring of cultural creation. Old World and New World, large countries and small, all will be stirred after the war by a new self-reliance, a new faith in national powers, a new willingness to fulfill national duties. No doubt this new patriotic passion will separate nation from nation. However far it may remain distant from shallow chauvinism, and however much it may transcend mere military preparedness, it surely will stir in each country the wish for independence with all its economic, political, and cultural consequences. Self-centred effort will triumph in energetic rivalry. Yet loyal ambition is not strife, patriotic rivalry is not a desire to crush the rivals; the hope of each people to contribute its best gifts is not the hot craving for imperialistic world dominion; nationalism is in no way the foe of internationalism and peace.

This will indeed be the second great factor in the days to come. The memory of the world disaster cannot fade away in the next generation; the longing for peace will curb every unhealthy outgrowth of nationalism which threatens to disturb the development of neighbors. The will of the world must be bent toward keeping harmony in the household of civilization. Whatever the outcome may be when the grave-faced men sit around the polished table, the nations will go out into the world with the instinctive feel-

ing that such a horror must not come again, unless Western culture is to break down



as once the Old World sunk into mediæval darkness.

But while the peoples may be of one mind in such a wish, many opinions will prevail in every nation as to the safest way to secure peace for the remainder of the century. Certainly the simplest and oldest prescription for peace, protective armament, will not be ruled out. Munition factories all over the globe will flourish as never before in times of peace. The pacifists will vainly proclaim that the wild armament race has proved a failure and that it hastened the clash; the piles of shells will be higher than ever. Yet the distrust of this insurance against war will grow too. If Europe really hoped "to reap the harvest of perpetual peace by this one bloody trial of sharp war," the chances for success seem after all too slight, unless other aids are sought than the threatening of new sharp wars. The need of surer means will be felt most deeply.

Peace must be secured from within; not fortresses and guns but good-will must prevent strife in the future. Have not the nations learned through these two years that their material exchange binds them more firmly together than they ever fancied? Was not the sheet of paper on which these words are printed bought at an unheard-of price because they are fighting on the other half of the globe? In the world of the market every declaration of independence is in vain. As long as the guns are roaring, economic generalists may work out their campaign plans for the destruction of the enemy's commerce in future years; war is war. But peace is peace, and, above all, business is business. Where dyes are needed a submarine will find the way to bring them even when cruisers patrol. The high demands and the low bids will meet each other when the war is ended. But art and music, literature and religion, science and scholarship, will follow soon. Surely they are not products of colorless cosmopolitanism; even the truth must wear a national garb. But they do demand international touch and union. There need be no anxiety; world's fairs and world's vanity fairs will flourish again and the fashions of the intellectuals will soon enough glitter in all national tints and hues.

But we had all this before. America, Europe, and Asia were one great market, with all the traffic of coin and culture. Yet it did not save us. We politely bartered our pleasant emotions and our pretty commodities; and one August morning we were suddenly savages in deadly fury. We need a better protection for the days to come. But had we not a safer armor before, an armor much hailed by forty-eight nations? Had we not in the peaceful Hague built a beautiful house of arbitration? Germany gave the noble iron gate for it—what a pity that the web of the spider has been spun about the hammered gate of the deserted palace devoted to international justice! Alas, the war has shaken the naïve confidence. Some will probably go on with the game of painting everything white or black and just or unjust, and when it happens that their just cause suffers, they will lament that might has triumphed over justice.

The war has taught us a truer lesson. In the world of national conflicts, it would be easy to fight the horrors of war, if the just and the unjust really stood opposed to one another. Only in a world history rewritten for children is the right smashed by wrong; in reality one right suffers from the struggle and contest with another.

In almost every conflict of peoples both sides are right and both nations would be unworthy of their heritage if they did not stand for their good cause. In almost every war of modern history the real cause was not justiciable. Real international wrongs have mostly been hushed up and have seldom led to bloody conflicts and unjust intentions have usually won by bribery. No international tribunals are needed for the culprits; they work with subtler means than war. But when the clouds of war are massing above the horizon and when a true struggle of peoples is near, good rights stand against good rights, rights inherited, rights won through honest work, rights acquired by custom. No Judge knows means of justice by which he can decide between two equally good rights when they are unfit for compromise and the best meaning council cannot bring help. If a final decision is secured by power and passion, it is not that might intrudes upon right, but that might steps

in because where equal right is on both sides the Judge is helpless.

But, then, at least we ought to rule out the passion; nobody ought to take up arms until a year has passed, a year in which commissions have gathered and examined and recorded the facts and made the complex issues simple, or—which usually is still more quieting for passions—made the simple issues confused. But will the hysteria of a yellow press yield to the zeal of Chairmen and Recording Secretaries until twelve months have passed over the injury to the nation? Only one way seems open—a might must be established which is stronger than the right of self-defense. We must be able to compel the unruly nation by militant power to wait a year at the gates of the arena. This is the program of the League to Enforce Peace, with the "Enforce" printed red in the title. Will it really bring us salvation?

At the threshold we must not forget that the year of enforced waiting would protect any wrongdoer. If a wrong can be continued in any case for a whole year the injury may have become irreparable; to take away the weapons of protection for a year may mean to make the victim helpless and to settle the issue against the innocent. A nation may violate the sea rights of another, may destroy its mail, blacklist its commerce, and yet it may be entirely safe in doing

before that date; and the result, according to the plans, would be that all the nations of the league would be obliged to enter into the struggle. Every local fight would thus have a tendency to grow into a world war; truly such a "League to Enforce Peace" would be a league to endanger peace.

Some imagine that such a general disaster would be averted because no nation would dare to face a whole world in arms. Yet the Germans have had to fight against fivefold superiority, and after two years practically no enemy stands on German soil. Above all, such a fight of the world against one is a fiction which would never be realized. A nation in the league might be bound by the obligation to turn against the power which declared war. But this might conflict with its other duty to defend a friend or a neighboring people whose welfare might be intertwined with its own free existence. In the real setting of the historic nations not one can be crushed without weakening certain others, and these certainly have no right to sacrifice their own future. Automatically they would join the friend, and the outcome would be one alliance against another alliance, a battlefield of many thousand miles where without the league a few short contests might have settled a provincial quarrel.

The League to Enforce Peace is like

be followed by an age of peace if it can lead to such an alliance.

What are the prospects? One thing may be taken for granted by all who count with realities—Germany cannot be torn in pieces and cannot be demolished. Germany will remain in any case a powerful nation. Will Germany, supported by Austria, remain isolated on one side while the Allies of today remain allies on the other? Too much has leaked out; no serious Englishman or Frenchman or Italian or Russian believes it. A team is a team, harnessed for a task, but not a family bound together for the life of children and children's children. England and France hardly hide the discomfort of the yoke; the comradeship of Algeciras came, after all, only ten years after Fashoda. Italy? It could hardly have done a greater service to its old allies than to join its new ones. To have forced Italy into the war was probably England's severest blunder; at once Austria was united and the Balkans estranged.

This burden will not be carried long. But most certainly England and Russia must part ways when the peace is signed. The contrast of their world interests has not been changed in the least by the war against the Central Powers. It is not so long ago that the music halls of London resounded to the applause for the popular song:

We have fought the bear before,
And while we are Britons true
The Russians shall not have
Con-stan-ti-nople.

Of course, those others cannot have Constantinople, while they are Britons true.

What, after all, is Germany? Even before the war with all its large African colonies the German Empire had only 3,000,000 square kilometers. It is a dwarf beside the two giants—Russia with 23,000,000 and Great Britain with 33,000,000. Theirs are the world empires, with clearly opposite interests, opposite traditions, and opposite ideals. For a day they can make a partnership against their energetic German neighbor, but when the local warfare ceases they cannot forget the world problems which keep them separated forever. And Russia's new partner, Japan, laughs. That is the future of the Allies, but who will be the allies of the future?

After the war the Russian and the British world empires will and must be the central energies of two diverging combinations, and Germany, whatever the peace may bring, will be the one European power which can tip the scale for either on the world balance. Many in Germany would quickly decide in favor of an alliance with Russia. Austria, Turkey, and Japan would join it heartily and other nations would lean toward it. It would be a tremendous alliance—and yet it would bring incalculable harm. One effect would be sure—it would lead to a war with England after a few short years. Russia, with Japan, Germany, Austria, and Turkey combined, would feel strong enough for the final blow of the bear's paw at India and Egypt. Revenge on England would be the German motive for this unnatural alliance, and the war cry of revenge would stir all the nations which have winced under England's grasp.

This would be really the superwar, and the struggle of today would appear a mere prelude. The world would be at stake. Europe would be devastated, for the first time Asia would tremble, and America would be drenched with blood. The peace after this war would be only a signal for a new grouping which would raise the spectre of a new and more horrible struggle to terrorize the earth. The German-Russian-Japanese alliance would be a league to enforce war; but we want peace, and every effort ought to be bent to avert such a gruesome future.

Only one way remains open, the way in the opposite direction. Germany must join not Russia, but England. Moreover, as Japan has definitely allied itself with Russia for the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine, and as the two Asiatic powers would menace America's position in the Pacific, the United States cannot remain isolated. But every danger for its world commerce is removed if America joins the British-German alliance. The English Navy, the German Army, the American wealth, nay, the English diplomacy, the German thoroughness, and the American optimism and dash, form an alliance which is invincible. It is the one league in the world the mere existence of which would guarantee the peace of the next genera-

so for a year because no threatening ultimatum is permitted.

But worse than that: Instead of cooling the war temper the year of delay would simply become a year of wild preparation which would raise the passion to fever heat. If the nations of Europe had foreseen the war of today and had known the date of its beginning a year before each would have known how to use the available time. Russia would have hastily completed its railway system; France and England would have strengthened their war industry; and above all Germany would have prepared by provisioning herself for years like a fortress. She could have done it easily; her lack of preparation was her only misfortune; it would have been avoided if the German Government had known a year, or at least a month, before that the break would come.

Moreover, the year of preparation would not only include guns and shells, flour and canned goods, but alliances; the year would become a year for the expansion of the crisis. More and more nations would take the one or the other side, and the provincial struggle would swell during the year into a continental warfare. But worst of all: A strong people, unwilling to suffer injury for a year and unwilling to give the opponents all the chances for a year's sinister preparation, would send its ultimatum

the league for the use of Esperanto. This, too, was invented in order to harmonize the nations of the globe. Their common mistake is to fancy that in the world of history an artificial abstract construction can replace that which has grown organically. The linguistic forms of a nation's expression and the emotional forms of its friendly or hostile behavior cannot be created in a philological or juristic laboratory; they have to grow in free historical development. The mere abstract formula for international war obligations, treating each case after the same logical pattern, must remain a failure. It will always be brought to nothing by the organic alliances which are held together by the self-conscious will and the historic interests of great nations. Does this suggest that no outer force exists which can keep order in this unruly world? Certainly not. It does mean only that such a force can never be created by a mechanical prescription with paragraphs fit for every case, but that the power to enforce peace must come from a true living alliance of nations physically strong enough to discourage every enemy and morally strong enough to win the faith of the world. Such an alliance would not be bound by treaties and penalties, but by inner affinity, by loyalty to common ideas, by unity of national mission and international purpose. The war of today will

tion. France and Austria, Italy and Sweden, Holland and Spain, Brazil and Argentina, would naturally cluster about this massive union of the big three. It would be America and Central Western Europe on one side, Asia and Eastern Europe on the other; but such a partition of the world would not even suggest a contest of arms, as Russia could not dare to attack India and Germany at the same time. It would be truly a world division with a historic allotment of peaceful tasks. If America, Great Britain, and Germany frankly and heartily decide to stand together, the war of today may be the last great war for a century.

Obstacles surely crowd this way, but is it not worth every effort to remove the hindrances, if it is clear that every other way leads only to abysses? America felt strong in its traditional policy of avoiding alliances with the distant European nations, but in this age of the storage battery and the wireless those European countries are no longer distant. They have become near neighbors, and the politics of the United States is firmly intertwined with their fate. But it appears useless to discuss the small serious arguments against such a union, as one opposing power seems greater than arguments—the hate. The sowers of hate have gone up and down through the three lands and the seed has grown. Will not this hate strike out every line of a possible treaty? No, and a hundred times no, because British and Germans and Americans are not Sicilians and Corsicans who swear vendetta. Teutons can hate, but they hate nothing worse than hatred. It is tolerated as long as it serves its purpose of stirring the soul for the passionate deed, but when the smoke of the guns has been dispersed by the wind the hatred will have cleared away too. Among the many feelings in which these three noble peoples will find their union there will surely be the common feeling of shame at the absurd extent of their loathing.

The sober hours will come and the necessary illusions will lose their influence. Germans, British, and Americans alike will see that they operated with too simple psychology, simple as that of the moving-picture dramas where no complex mental states are allowed and every character is angel or villain and must shout yes or no. It is not true that the responsible men of any nation wanted war. They all sincerely wished to avoid it, while they all saw its unavoidable coming. They really did not want it, and yet subconsciously they all wanted it. Even when the furies of war had swept through the land no nation planned an immoral deed. It is true in Belgium and Greece, in Persia and Spain, in China and Africa, and where not, treaties were ignored in this war; but has not the Supreme Court of the United States for all time proclaimed "that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregard of their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so? Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." It stamps it as the American idea of international law "that, while it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was the prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence." Many mistakes have been made. German statesmen regret sin-

cerely the German ones; no doubt the British feel the same about the British ones. No one can wonder that in the heat of the struggle those blunders, when they did harm, were denounced as moral wrongs, that every unintentional homicide was branded as murder and every munition sale was abused as hypocrisy and violation of neutrality. But can this temper last?

Are we not anyhow too much under the suggestion of the impudent headlines? However much the press, the priests, and, alas! the professors have sinned in all three lands, do we not overestimate the amount of hatred? Germany and England have almost buried it, and America will follow. Above all, it has had to struggle more and more with the opposite feeling. Those who really know are sure that the strongest mental effect of these two years of war is a new mutual respect of the belligerent nations for one another. The Germans had never believed that France still possessed such wonderful courage and that Russia had improved its national life so much since the Japanese war and that Great Britain would find such imposing loyalty in its colonies. Nor had Western Europe believed that Austria or "the sick man" Turkey would show so much strength, and the admiration for Germany's efficiency is proved by the eager imitation. The loud and fashionable detestation belonged to the claptrap of the war; the increased respect will be the lasting outcome. How England and France or England and the Boers hated each other! How bitter was the hatred between Russia and Japan, and today they are cordially united. When peace comes the hatred will be the nightmare of yesterday; the Teuton mind will shake it off and America, Britain, and Germany will form the one alliance which will secure peace without any clouds on the horizon.

But surely one other resolution will be necessary for it. If the world wants real peace for the twentieth century it must prepare for it by the terms of Christmas, 1916. The one alliance which can save Western Europe will not come if it is not initiated by the spirit of this Fall's peace negotiations. If any great nation leaves the field humiliated its ranking wound will endanger the future. Each has bravely given its heart's blood for its freedom, each must return from the battle in honor with unbroken sword. The triumph of past conflicts was to see the foe in the dust; in our age of the new idealism the greatest triumph in the struggles of war as in the battles of social reform is not to crush the enemy but the enmity. This war was worth the appalling sacrifices only if through it not one people but mankind is advanced. Each nation must feel a stronger self-reliance, a happier willingness to live up to its mission, a larger trust in its safety and its future than it ever felt in the age before the explosion. That was a time of distrust and suspicion and envy and anger and fear which choked the strongest; we greet the new time of mutual confidence.

Germany has earned the most obvious war laurels of the old style, as its brave armies hold the conquered lands of the enemy. It is, therefore, first of all Germany's duty to initiate the coming age; and Germany is ready. Germany will not demand a square foot of the conquered territory in France or Belgium; this is an area abundant in treasures of

the soil which Germany needs; but it will renounce them, and this ought to be the symbol for the settlements of the coming Winter. More than that, the Germans see with open eyes that they will suffer great and painful colonial losses. The jewel of their love, Kiao-Chau, may never be returned to them; and, worse, the only large colony which was really fit for the German immigrant, Southwest Africa, may be held by the Boers who invaded it. It will be only a small territorial substitute if Germany receives the old German province of Courland from Russia and perhaps other African colonies from France, from Belgium, from Portugal, where German people cannot live, but from which at least raw material may be secured for German industry.

Germany even seems to be willing in the interest of the peace of Europe to have Poland made a kingdom again, connected with Austria. No doubt this, too, involves a certain German sacrifice, as it may easily bring restlessness to the Poles of Prussia's eastern provinces. It may be that Bessarabia will go to Rumania, but surely Russia will have no reason to complain. A wonderfully rich prize will be hers, as the world will be ready to give all Persia to Russia, and with it the harbors which no ice can block. Even Afghanistan may fall to her lot.

England, as always through the centuries, will be a winner without loss. The diamond land of Southwest Africa may be added to Rhodesia. But England will also get possession of Egypt, after having forgotten for a while that she does not possess it yet. France will receive back all the land which Germany has conquered, and it may be that the peace conference will give to her that part of Lorraine which she occupies today, perhaps in exchange for a good part of Morocco in order that Germany may have at least some foothold in Africa where Germans can live in a moderate climate. Belgium will certainly go back to the Belgians, and at last their racial instinct will be fulfilled; the Flemish and the Walloons will find the chance to have separate administration in their own languages.

It is easy to foresee that there will be some malcontents in every German village who will complain as the Japanese complained after the peace of Portsmouth. They will feel that the German armies had made the greatest gains and that the diplomats took from their hands what they conquered. Their lament will sound faintly in the chorus of German approval.

When the war broke out no responsible German dreamed of conquest. The cartoonists of her enemies amused their public with Germany's plans for European dominion and comforted them with Germany's failure, as she did not even swallow Paris and Petrograd, not to speak of Peking and Rio de Janeiro. The Germans made in Germany see the hopes fulfilled with which they took up the defense of their country. Not the gain of territory but the safety of Germany's future was their dream. Long freight trains will move to and fro between Berlin and Bagdad, the pressure from east and west will be removed, the sea will be free for Germany's industry and world commerce, the encircling ring of jealousy is broken once for all. Europe knows now the German swords and spears; tomorrow they will be beaten into pruning

hooks and plowshares. The jealousy between England and Germany will yield to an earnest desire for mutual understanding, and each will learn from the other. Germany's respect for England's success in its colonies and England's respect for Germany's social organization will mold the future of the two nations. How much less would Germany gain, if it gained more!

But it is not enough that Germany and England alone lay the foundations for the great future alliance in the peace negotiations. The third partner must not wait until the decisive steps of the European nations have been taken. The one alliance which can crown the century demands not only that Germany and England find each other but that they find each other through the good-will of America. Sensationalists have tired our ear with their cries of remember this and remember that and remember everything; it is a greater art and a higher task to forget. If America will, both Germany and England can forget, and in the ocean of thought which binds the three peoples the submarines of emotion will leave their torpedoes at home and will ply unarmed to the foreign shores. Individuals are freer than peoples. Nothing seems needed but that three great men listen to the voice of the age and fulfill today the sacred task for which it may be too late tomorrow. The gods of history have put three great Democrats each into the place of honor and trust and power. If Woodrow Wilson, Bethmann Hollweg, and Lloyd George will speak the word for which the century is ripe, not only this war will be ended, but future wars will be impossible.

It is true Germans and German-Americans will abound who cannot imagine that President Wilson would be an impartial mediator. Many a decision of his has pierced their hearts. They felt the undertone of his English sympathies and doubt whether he could free himself from prejudices against England's enemy. Truly they are poor psychologists who cannot see deeper into his mind. It is easy to attack the President for campaign purposes, as the type of his mind is liable to be misconstrued. It must be illuminated from one centre—Woodrow Wilson's mind is essentially aesthetic. The aesthetic ideals of harmony, of unity, of beauty, of perfection, have for the first time in history irradiated from the White House. Only one result of this aesthetic attitude is essential here; a mind which is deeply stirred by the longing for aesthetic unity will sink perfectly into any rôle which is seriously undertaken. The personality is so completely fascinated by the idea of a perfect embodiment that all the prejudices and instincts of the daily life disappear; they are burned out by the glowing fire of enthusiasm for the mission which history has imposed. No greater rôle to be played could come to a man today than that of being the mediator between the enemies in Europe; no fitter mind for this rôle than that of the President. The neutral nations of the Old World will faithfully follow his lead, the belligerent nations will never forget his courageous act, and their gratitude will forever wipe out the memories of European anti-Americanism. Three men must speak; three nations will follow; three nations will march on, and their Teutonic alliance will bring to the war-ridden world the glories of peace for ages and ages hereafter.