IF THE TREATY IS REJECTED— WHAT THEN?

The Question Answered by Hitchcock and Borah.

What will happen if the Peace Treaty is rejected by the United States?

TWO answers by Senate leaders on the opposing sides are presented below. The two spokesmen are the Administration floor leader who is fighting to have the treaty ratified without any reservations that will change the meaning, and the leader of the extreme opponents.

By GILBERT M. HITCHCOCK, Senator from Nebraska; Administration Floor Leader in Urging Adoption of the Treaty.

The Senate should fail to ratify the treaty, or should amend it so as to kill it, or should adopt such reservations as to change its meaning, the situation would arise which your question contemplates, and the United States would not become a party to the peace settlement.

The treaty would, however, go into effect so far as the other nations are concerned. The United States would be isolated and would lose all concessions which the victorious nations have wrung at the cannon's mouth. We would lose Germany's acknowledgment of responsibility for the war and her promise to pay damages to our Government and our citizens.

We would lose her promise not to impose higher or other custom duties on our goods than on those charged to the most favored nation.

We would lose her promise to treat our shipping in her ports as favorably as German shipping is treated.

We would lose her agreement that we shall have the privilege of revising such of the treaties that existed before the war between Germany and the United States as we desire to revise.

We would lose Germany's agreement validating the acts by the United States and by the Alien Property Custodian, under which we seized and proved to liquidate $300,000,000 worth of property in the United States belonging to German citizens.

We would lose Germany's agreement that we could use the money derived from the sale of those properties to reimburse our citizens who had lost property in Germany. We would lose the right to use those funds to pay debts which Germany or German citizens now owe to American citizens.

We would lose the right to use these funds derived from the sale of this great amount of German property in the United States to pay pre-war claims against Germany, including the claims for the destruction of life and property involved in the sinking of the Lusitania and other vessels.

We would lose the agreement which Germany made that she shall not be held responsible for property, American pat- ents, and other things of value belonging to German citizens and companies which the United States seized and used during the war. Many of these patents were very valuable, and claims against the United States for patents on dyestuffs, explosives, and medicines would run into millions of dollars.

We would lose the right to retain over $200,000,000 of German shipping which had been left in the United States when we were a neutral country, but which Germany has agreed in the treaty to surrender. The nations associated with us in the war would set up claims to a part or all of this shipping, which they cannot do if we are a party to the treaty.

We would lose our membership in the Reparation Commission, which will be the most powerful international body ever created, and will have enormous power over the trade, finance and commerce of Germany, and, in fact, of the world, for years to come. This commission will have the power to control the German economic resources and dictate where and how and to what extent Germany may export its goods and its gold to buy imports from other countries.

These are some of the material things we would lose by failure to become a party to this treaty, which was secured from Germany at the cannon's mouth. They all represent concessions which Germany would not willingly grant.

We would then be reduced to the alternative of drifting into an unconditional peace with Germany with all the war issues unsettled, or, on the other hand, of approaching Germany with a proposition to negotiate a peace. This would give Germany the opportunity to make conditions, and it would deprive us of the power to dictate the terms ourselves. We have withdrawn our armies from Europe except a few thousand men, and have practically completed demobiliza- tion. We are through fighting, and Germany knows it. If we fail to hold her to the bargain made at Versailles when the armies were in the field and when Germany was helpless, we will be compelled to negotiate as equals and lose a large part of all that was granted in the settlement. If we fail to negotiate a settlement Germany can insist on a settlement at a future date. What we did with regard to the $300,000,000 of property belonging to German citizens in this country was done on the theory that we were going to be victorious in the war and could dictate terms of peace to Germany, but if we lose our opportunity to dictate terms of peace the question of disposition of this vast sum of money would be one that would remain open until the two countries can agree upon a settlement.

It is evident, moreover, that the Reparation Commission, on which each nation that signs the treaty will be represented, will control the industrial, commercial and mining resources of Germany as to facilitate the payment of damages to those countries, but that they will also use that control to benefit their own commerce, and if the United States is not represented on that
Nations would be compelled to look forward to an uncertain future. Each would contemplate the possibility of another war and would resume war preparations. This would include the United States. The hatred and enmity of Germany would not have the restraint and control of any peace settlement. The nations that have been associated with us would be greatly embarrassed by our refusal to take part in a permanent peace settlement. Poland, Bohemia, and the Bulgarians would feel that we had deserted them and, their interests being as much at stake as a world organization for peace, would be endangered by the failure of the most powerful nation in the world to participate.

By WILLIAM E. BORAH

Senator from Idaho, leader of the extreme opponents who seek to defeat the Treaty.

If the treaty is rejected, the United States will be relieved at once of all obligations, legal or moral, to take part in European affairs, and we will as a people be enabled to take up at once and devote our entire time and attention to the solution of impending domestic problems. Whatever we should see fit to think proper to do in the way of friendly assistance, advice, or support for other peoples anywhere, we should be able to do of our own volition and in our own way, relieved entirely of the embarrassment of carrying forward the plans and schemes of other nations.

For illustration, we are in Russia now not by reason of any interest or desire, instead of being made aware by a world organization for peace, we would be endangered by the failure of the most powerful nation in the world to participate.

Strongly Against Any Simplicity of Martyrdom—(In This Case Charles L. Napoleon Bonaparte, and Louis XVI.)

In crushing down the Czarist Government. The United States has been and is trading with Germany. Peace in all its practical features and appearance is an established fact and has been for weeks and works. The treaty ratified by Great Britain, France, and Italy fixes the status of Germany. The result, let the peace move as the result, in receiving the repudiation will proceed to collect and enjoy it. These interferences with the execution of the provisions of the treaty. The United States, being in no condition to enter into such a treaty, would be and should be relieved of all obligations touching them. Any legislation of the United States to trade or war legislation could be had within a fortnight. The result would be to settle little by little and deal with domestic problems. People would become at once convinced of the need of the abandonment of the old, perverted, exaggerated beliefs and traditions, and we would enjoy, in my judgment, a period of prosperity such as we have never before known.

If we enter this League, the United States does not enter into any European treaty, continue to meddle and meddlesome in European affairs and assist in the sweeping up of Europe, and these matters will be thrown into our own home politics, will divert attention from the real needs of the world, which are the needs of the people, and prevent the return of that peace and confidence so essential to our future prosperity and happiness and indispensable to the permanency of our institutions.

In view of the nature of our domestic problems, in view of the business problem, in view of the economic problem, in view of the searching import, it seems to me that nothing less than a crime to throw into the hands of men of good will the torturing problem of European surveillance. It will present questions too important to our own national policy, which will dominate, divide, divide, our people, divert the public mind from the consideration of the facts of everyday life, shape national policies to the exclusion of any proper consideration of things that really affect our solvency, our prosperity, our national life, our time to these problems and mobilizing our moral and intellectual forces for the solution of these problems, constantly and everlastingly into considering questions growing out of our own domestic affairs, the bane of bicker and thither, and all the belligerent and antagonistic forces of the Old World. Our people and our friends will be put behind us.

What a venture, what a hazard all this! Nations and peoples differing in beliefs, standards, customs, color, language, religions, and government, all joined together under a working combination, under a control that is not our consent. If civilization were seeking a deadly weapon for suicide without substituting, we need not go further. Japan and the United States and the United States vetoed Japan. Then they get down to business, the business of our own, but because certain other powers have further motives with reference to Siberia, and we have become entangled by understandings, express or implied, and hasty to draw out. Our men are being sacrificed for no interest of our own, but because of an interwoven of interests in European affairs. To draw out of Russia is to create a duel on other directions. Therefore we stay and our soldiers are being sacrificed. If the treaty were rejected, all such things would be stopped, the United States would be safe, the United States would be at ease upon these questions:

If the treaty were rejected we would be relieved of the responsibility in such moral breakdowns as the Shantung affair. We would not and could not be charged with the shameless betrayal of an old friend and associate in the war. We would not incur the ill-will, possibly the settled enmity, of 400,000,000 people. We would not forfeit our moral prestige and our national honor in the court of civilization. Whether we could through friendly counsel or even on occasion upon the Hay policy effectuate justice for a friendly people, we would at least not be a party to the crime— and moral prestige is, after all, still the greatest asset of a nation. Free clean and relieved and exhillarant the whole national mind would feel upon tomorrow morning if it were known that this shabby crime against China had been forever removed as a charge against our country!

The Highest View

Jean Bull and Uncle Sam, Are Scoring lustily A New International Anthem Addressed to the Town Pump.

From an English Point of View

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